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ABSTRACT 
This commentary does not deal with politicians within the university or at the federal or 
municipal levels, limiting itself to persons, whether elected or appointed, in government 
office at the provincial level. In addition to the university's "primary " area of interaction 
with government (Universities Minister, Grants Commission, Premier), there is an important 
"secondary "area (for example, Health, Agriculture, Energy and Resources, Industry, 
Labour, etc.) where there must be co-operation but where differing responsibilities imply 
different objectives. Examples are given to show that on the government side there has in 
recent years been a diminishing concern to prevent such differences from becoming clashes. 
In the "primary " sector the direction in which the relationship has moved in recent years 
has been downward. Public reaction against the universities and disunity within them have 
combined to invite government infringement upon university autonomy and abridgement 
of commitments; examples are given. The reasons for the absence of public protest are 
analyzed. A general conclusion is that a university's relations with government reflect pri-
marily the realities of power and influence of the moment. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les présidents d'université et les politiciens 
La communication présente ne traite ni de politiciens au sein de l'université, ni de ceux aux 
niveaux fédéral ou municipal. Elle se limite aux personnes, soit élues soit nommées, dé-
tenant des postes au niveau provincial. Outre le domaine "primaire"d'action réciproque 
entre l'université et le gouvernement (ministre responsable des Universités, commissions 
de subventions, premier ministre), il existe un domaine "secondaire"(par example, la 
Santé, l'Agriculture, l'Énergie et les Resources, l'Industrie, le Travail) où s'avère essentielle 
une collaboration entre les deux. Pourtant, ici, il s'agit de diverses responsabilités impli-
quant des objectifs différents. On donne des exemples pour illustrer que, du côté du gouver-
nement, les efforts vont en se diminuant pour éviter que de telles différences ne deviennent 
des conflits. Au secteur "primaire", les rapports université/gouvernement reculent dequis 
quelques années. La réaction publique défavorable à l'égard des universités et le manque 
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d'unité chez celles-ci encouragent le gouvernement à empieter sur l'autonomie des univer-
sités et à diminuer ses engagements vis à vis de ces institutions. Là-dessus, l'auteur donne 
des exemples. Il fait aussi une analyse du raisonnement qui explique l'absence de protesta-
tion publique. Une contusion globale: les rapports entre l'université et le gouvernement 
reflètent surtout les réalités du pouvoir et des influences au moment donné. 
The title of this series poses an initial question of scope. Taking "politicians" in an only 
slightly extended sense, the university itself is full of politicians. The university's favorite 
metaphor of itself is "a community of scholars," and as members of a quasi-community 
the university's staff and students stand in a quasi-political relation with each other and 
with the whole. Those with a responsibility on behalf of others—administrators, staff and 
student leaders—may, from this point of view, be thought of as "politicians"; and the great-
er such responsibility—vested or voluntary, actual or pursued—the more "political" (other 
things being equal) will its holder or seeker be. In this sense, every time the president, him-
self inescapably "political," deals with a dean or department head, a spokesman for the 
Faculty Association or the Student 's Union, or a representative of any of the myriad re-
cognizable interests in the university, he is dealing with a "politician". This is a fascinating 
story (I 'm sometimes unsure whether to think it a comedy with tragic aspects or a tragedy 
with a comic subplot), instructive and well worth the telling, but it must await its turn. For 
the present I will take "politicians" only in the sense of persons involved in government. 
This still leaves us with far too large a subject to manage in one lecture, so I will set aside 
federal and municipal politics, although these too constitute stories worth telling, and limit 
myself wholly to provincial politics. Further, in an act of great self-denial, I will refrain 
from including politicians in Opposition or private members on the government side, al-
though this means foregoing the comedy of the irresponsible, or rather of those without 
responsible office (I do not say that it means foregoing the theatre of the absurd). My lecture 
thus limits the scope of "politicians" to those, whether elected or appointed, in government 
office at the provincial level. 
I think most people, in considering the title "University Presidents and the Politicians" 
as I've just delimited it, would envision university presidents individually or in formed com-
mittees interacting with their respective Ministers of University Affairs (or Higher Education, 
or whatever the nomenclature of the province), and, less frequently, with their provincial 
premiers. Deputy ministers and other civil servants would be involved, but these are not 
politicians, are they? In most provinces a committee or commission advisory to government 
would also be involved, but again these are not supposed to be political. Other politicians 
might involve themselves from time to time, chiefly when the estimates of the Department 
of University Affairs are being debated, but their relation to the university president would 
be occasional and remote. The canvas would not appear very crowded. 
This picture, which rises out of the usual constitutional arrangements for universities in 
Canada, may correspond to the actual situation of some universities of narrow scope. But 
in most major universities, particularly those which used to be called the "provincial" uni-
versities and which still have all or most of the professional faculties in the province, it cor-
responds to only a part of the situation—albeit the central part—and the university's (or the 
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university president's) other interactions with politicians are significant both in their own 
right and also because they influence this primary or "constitutional" interaction. It will 
therefore be useful to defer our treatment of the "primary" interaction until we have some 
sense of the range and nature of these "secondary" interactions. To get the richest mix of 
implications, let us postulate a situation (true in most provinces) where the "provincial" 
university comprises the bulk of the pool of research and consulting expertise regularly and 
locally available to government. 
The most obvious of the additional areas of government to interact with such universities 
is the Department of Health, which characteristically contributes substantially to the teach-
ing and research costs of the Faculty of Medicine, and on occasion to such faculties as Dentis-
try, Nursing, and Pharmacy. It also controls the entry into and the conditions of practice 
in these professions, and is usually their largest single employer. Another area of government 
which typically makes substantial and regular contributions to a professional sector and em-
ploys many of its graduates is the Department of Agriculture, which relates directly to such 
faculties as Agriculture, Engineering, and, where there is one, Veterinary Science; indeed, 
the Faculty of Agriculture sometimes contractually constitutes the research arm of the pro-
vincial Department of Agriculture. I am not personally familiar with the arrangements where 
forestry and fisheries are the major resource industries, but I understand they are roughly 
comparable. 
Next is a group of government departments whose financial contributions are less regular 
and usually rise out of particular projects, but which are in virtually constant interaction 
with particular university sectors. Energy, Mines, and Resources (nomenclature and organ-
ization vary among provinces) depends heavily upon the Faculty of Engineering and the 
Department of Earth Science, and to a lesser extent upon departments of Landscape Archi-
tecture and Planning. Departments such as Highways, Urban Affairs, Housing, and Industry 
rely upon the same group of faculties and in varying degrees also upon the Faculty of Ad-
ministrative Studies and the departments of Economics, Geography, Psychology, Applied 
Mathematics and Statistics. Welfare relates to the School of Social Work and the Department 
of Psychology, as does the Department of Corrections, which also relates to the Faculty of 
Law. 
Next is a group of government departments whose financial contributions are limited 
but which have strong and direct professional interdependence with specific faculties: the 
Department of Education with the Faculties of Education and Physical Education, the 
Attorney-General's Department with the Faculty of Law. 
Then there are some government departments, such as Northern Development, Native 
Peoples, Tourism, Recreation, and Culture, whose contributions and requirements vary 
greatly in significance from year to year, and of ten traverse a number of university sectors. 
A relatively recent but now crucial involvement is that of the Department of Labour. 
It has certain needs which relate it to specific university sectors (for example, Administrative 
Studies, Law, Economics), but since the advent of unionization in universities it is particu-
larly interested in the university as employer. 
This list (in which I have made no attempt to be comprehensive), when added to the 
"primary" or "consti tutional" involvement of the Universities Minister, the advisory com-
mittee, and the Premier, may suggest that virtually all departments of the provincial govern-
ment are involved with the university (and the university president). That would not be 
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much of an exaggeration, for even those which are not directly involved as exemplified here 
are, I am told, sometimes vociferous enough in Cabinet when spending or policy is deter-
mined. 
II 
A university's "secondary" relations with government must involve an element of conflict 
—if not of persons then at least of interests—because even while the parties are working to-
gether their responsibilities differ greatly. With determined goodwill and sustained deference 
to the other side's needs such differences of interest can be prevented from becoming clashes 
between persons and therefore between the institutions, but this requires adequate motiva-
tion, and it will be a theme of this lecture that on the government side such motivation has 
been on the wane in recent years. 
Let us look at some ways in which conflicts in the "secondary" sector may develop. Given 
the multiplicity of provincial departments with regular or occasional interests in one or 
other university sector, and the marked preference of government departments for acting 
on their own rather than channeling their money through a sister (and perhaps competing) 
department, there will be a tendency for direct lines to develop between government depart-
ments and university units, bypassing both the Minister of University Affairs and the univer-
sity president until some contract or grant requires the latter's approval. Unless the proposed 
contract clearly violates university policy, this is a bad stage at which to stop it, since expec-
tations will have been raised, plans laid, and often anticipatory money spent or commitments 
made. On the other hand, each time a contract which has run such a course is approved the 
path is smoothed for further unreported negotiations leading to /ai ts accomplis, until the point 
is reached where the coherence of the university, the direction of its development, and the 
balance of its parts are at risk, and to protect them it becomes necessary to assert the timely 
presence of the central administration. If, as is likely, this is done by a new president, unen-
cumbered by previous ex post facto approvals, suspicion and resentment are immediately 
aroused on both the government and university sides: does the new man mean to withdraw 
the university into an ivory tower? or, if he means it to retain a service funct ion, does he 
intend to seize all power for his office? 
Let us assume that after some time the president has succeeded in having referred to his 
office for early scrutiny all major proposals that seem to have a chance of materializing. To 
allay the suspicion and resentment which the inauguration of such a procedure will cause, 
he is likely to lean over backward to try to support projects a faculty wants. Some will give 
him no trouble: there are research and service agreements in effect which bring important 
benefits to both sides, with few if any adverse consequences. But many proposals will give 
him trouble: trouble of one sort if he approves, trouble of another sort if he doesn't. Sup-
pose, for example, an inherently desirable project is jointly developed by a government 
department and a university faculty and put forward as a three-year pilot — to put, let us 
say, a field section of Social Work into a remote northern area full of social problems. The 
university would learn a good deal about northern social conditions, the northern community 
would benefit , a promising educational experiment would be undertaken; and the only real 
criticism is that funding beyond the initial three years is not in the proposed contract. The 
government department explains unofficially that it is against policy to make longer com-
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mitments, but that if the experiment goes well continued support may be expected. If the 
president holds out for firmer guarantees he is likely to thwart a good undertaking, frustrate 
the faculty, and alienate an influential government department. He will probably accept the 
financial risk. Three years later, when the experiment is seen to be successful, the university 
may be told that the financial situation has changed, the government department must re-
trench, no funds are available to subsidize the project further, and the university ought to 
regard it as an established feature of its program to be carried on its own budget. Of course 
if the government is retrenching it is all too likely that the university is already feeling the 
results directly, and carrying the project on its own budget will be at the expense of its 
established operations. Nevertheless, since winding the project up would be an educational 
loss and would upset the faculty, hurt the affected communities, and anger the government 
(and not only the department in question), the likelihood is that the university will keep 
the project going at its own cost, with some of its other operations diminished. 
To take another kind of situation: suppose a government department refuses to recognize 
an important element of university policy — let us say its commitment to the freedom of 
publication by its researchers of the results of their research. Suppose the difference surfaces 
only after a highly desirable but politically explosive project is well under way, say an impact 
study of the proposed flooding, for hydro-electric development, of an area populated by 
native peoples. Suppose this has led to a hard, damaging struggle, partly public, in which the 
university manages to maintain its position, but despite this outcome the government depart-
ment continues to reject the university's policy of research openness. Suppose a later joint 
venture is proposed, again an inherently desirable one, and the university insists this time 
on spelling out in advance the policy of openness and its practical implementation; there 
may well be a threatening and punitive response f rom the government department. 
There may also be proposals which are simply unacceptable and would never be consider-
ed were it not that they emanate from government. Suppose a government department has, 
at substantial cost and using independently contracted personnel, developed a special instruc-
tional package, say on labour history and economics, designed for a particular target, such 
as remote-area industrial workers, and then, finding that the targeted consumers are not in-
terested unless they get university credit for the course, tries to arrange with one of the pro-
vince's universities to give such credit. Suppose that university's senate rejects the proposal 
because of certain biases and defects in the material, and the department tries the other uni-
versities, whose presidents reject it. An offer by the universities to provide, at cost and for 
academic credit, the kind of instruction desired, but using the universities' own staffs and 
materials (including anything academically acceptable in the specially-prepared package) 
is unlikely to allay the resentment of the thwarted department. 
An opposite situation leading to conflict is where one government department, say Edu-
cation, makes an essentially good decision, for example to increase the academic requirements 
for public-school teacher certification, and then its sister department of University Affairs 
refuses to assist the university in meeting the resultant increase in workload (for the "pro-
vincial" university cannot think of refusing such a burden). The university, which may not 
have been properly consulted about the action, is likely to find the situation particularly 
galling if the same minister presides over both departments. 
In some jurisdictions government ideology may be a fruitful source of conflict, for exam-
ple where the Minister of Labour is seen by most of the government's supporters (and sees 
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himself) as the Minister for labour, particularly organized labour. Because of its history and 
nature, the university is likely everywhere to be the slowest really large employer to be 
unionized. In a particular university there may also have been, at an earlier time (or it may 
be suspected that there were), deliberate efforts to prevent unionization. If so, when a new 
thrust for unionization comes, most likely first f rom the non-academic staff, organizers are 
likely to want the open assistance of the Labour Minister, which may come in a very rough 
form. Assistance in the unionization of the academic staff, which may be demanded next, 
may require more than blunderbuss attacks on the university (although these may well con-
tinue); among other things it may require legislation, with attendant hearings and debates, 
and perhaps protracted proceedings in the Department's Labour Board. After unionization 
there may be further occasions for assisting unions during negotiations and strikes, all of 
which is likely to add materially to the tension between the Department and the university, 
or at least those sectors of the university not favored by the Department. 
Another example of conflict bred of ideology may be found in those jurisdictions where 
there is a history of mistrust between the governing party and certain professions. The health 
area is a particularly visible, although by no means unique, example. If a no-deterrent, fully 
government-paid medicare system has been installed, there will probably have been govern-
ment pressure for great and rapid expansion of the medical faculty. When the costs grow 
burdensome, however, a government suspicious of the medical profession is likely to try to 
force reductions in the earnings and changes in the method of compensation for the full- and 
part-time medical faculty, to change the Faculty's distribution of specialties and the balance 
between specialists and generalists, and to reduce the number of research fields and the at-
tention and space devoted to research. Hostility between the government and the medical 
profession will make the president's involvement in such issues all the more difficult. 
These are some examples of how conflict may develop between the university and those 
departments which constitute the university's "secondary" involvement with government. 
Sometimes the president will be seen by the government department as the cause of conflict, 
particularly when it is he who says no to a proposal or insists upon implementing university 
policy against the wishes of a minister. But whether the president is seen in this way or not, 
ministers who have been in conflict with the university, or whose departments have been, 
are not very likely to urge their colleague the Minister of University Affairs to be generous 
in the grant to the university, or advise restraint in any harsh measures he wishes to take 
beyond the financial area. There will usually also be examples of successful co-operation 
and good relations in the secondary sector, but in my own experience the conflicts rising 
from this sector were much the more influential in determining the government's attitude 
toward the University. It is possible that this was due to local factors and accidents of per-
sonality, but I think that ministerial conflict with a faculty or with the president is always 
more likely to be generalized into hostility to the university than ministerial co-operation 
into support for the university as a whole. 
Ill 
I turn now to the "primary" sector of the university's involvement with government, the 
Ministry of University Affairs, the advisory committee, and the Premier. I have time only 
to illustrate what in my experience has been the main trend of recent years. Were I to give 
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a balanced account of the whole relationship there would be a number of positive aspects 
to report, particularly in the opening years of the decade, but all I can hope to do in the 
remainder of this paper is indicate the direction in which the relationship has moved, which 
is downward. 
It is now an old story that the hopes of much of society focused during the late 1950's 
and much of the 1960's on education, particularly higher education. As a result, universities 
acquired great influence with governments, which expected to use them for both social and 
political gains. In addition to this direct influence of the universities there was their indirect 
power through their influence with the public: governments were very wary of incurring 
voter disapproval either by holding back on university support or by taking actions which 
might be denounced by universities as harmful to their nature or function. (At the time, 
most segments of the university community were still reasonably united in their view of 
how government should relate to the universities, although some students and support staff 
were beginning to depart f rom this consensus.) Accordingly, in addition to giving universities 
a steadily increasing share of resources, governments went to great lengths to avoid the ap-
pearance of interfering with universities, and to almost equal lengths to avoid the reality. 
Certainly I found this to be true in Ontario, and I believe it was true in most other provinces. 
When I went to Manitoba in 1970, where a new government had recently been elected, the 
Minister of Colleges and Universities Affairs told me, only half in jest, that he understood 
he was not supposed even to phone me lest it seem an intervention. On several occasions in 
the next year or so he spoke of his unwillingness to take actions which some successor less 
committed to university autonomy could treat as precedents for a policy of intervention. 
But by the early 1970's the reaction which had begun with the radical student movement 
of the 1960's and was intensified by other forms of campus strife and by the under-employ-
ment of university graduates, the slowing of enrolment growth, the universities' increased 
contribution to the tax burden, and other factors, had stripped the universities of much of 
their magic in the public eye, and with it a good deal of their influence with politicians and 
governments. Furthermore, the earlier near-consensus of the university community about 
how government should relate to the universities had largely disintegrated, and some voices 
within the universities were calling for governments to intervene in various ways in matters 
which had been earlier thought to be internal responsibilities. These voices could be heard 
in Manitoba as elsewhere, and the response to one such call of the Minister of Universities 
Affairs (the same person who had two or three years earlier been so scrupulous about uni-
versity autonomy) is most instructive. 
A difficult and painful tenure case had disturbed the University of Manitoba for almost 
two years. A negative decision, taken on the recommendation of the departmental and 
faculty tenure committees, had been appealed (as provided for under the University of 
Manitoba Act) to the Board of Governors, and after a marathon hearing the Board had 
sustained the withholding of tenure but ruled that there be a special twelve-month exten-
sion of appointment, with a new tenure hearing before a new committee. Getting a new 
committee within the university seemed impossible because of the narrowness of the special-
ty and the number of persons who had already been involved, so a proposal was made to the 
Board for an Advisory Committee from outside. This was approved, and in due course the 
committee visited the University, made its assessment, and advised negatively; the faculty 
tenure committee, by now reconstituted according to the request of the Faculty Association 
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as modified by Senate, supported the recommendation, and tenure was once again denied. 
The candidate, supported by the Faculty Association, asked the Board to hear another ap-
peal, and the Board, pointing out that under the Act it had a discretion on hearing appeals 
and that its intention in arranging a new tenure hearing by a new committee would be frus-
trated if it thereafter heard a new appeal, rejected the request. The Executive of the Faculty 
Association, accompanied by the Executive Secretary of the Canadian Association of Uni-
versity Teachers, then went to the Minister, argued that the decision by the Board not to 
hear a second appeal was unjust, said that if the Faculty Association achieved unionization 
it would insist that such matters go to binding arbitration by an external panel, and asked 
him to require the University to submit to such an arbitration in the present case. The Minis-
ter urgently summoned the Chancellor and me (he was unwilling to wait until the Chairman 
of the Board, who lived out of town, could arrive), informed us of the Faculty Association 
— CAUT action, said that he had not intended to intervene but the Faculty Association 
request had changed his mind, said that he didn't doubt the University's integrity but that 
"justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done," and asked the University 
forthwith to submit the case to arbitration. If it did not do so, he said, he would; he had 
not looked to see whether he had the legal power, but if he hadn' t he would get it, which 
would have much graver consequences for the University's autonomy than a "voluntary" 
use of arbitration. I asked why, if what the Faculty Association wanted was justice, it 
didn't use the courts, a procedure widely followed elsewhere in such matters and one which 
might circumscribe but did not threaten university autonomy and the special and valuable 
status of tenure. His reply was prompt and revealing: because the professor "wouldn' t 
stand a chance in court ." 
When all this was reported to an emergency meeting of the Board of Governors, it decid-
ed that the damage to the University of submitting to the Minister's will, although great, 
was less than would otherwise ensue. I will not trouble you with the extreme difficulty 
then encountered in reaching an arbitration agreement, the University finding itself dealing 
with three parties simultaneously who were not always in accord: the professor (whose 
salary was, at the Minister's demand, continued, although he had no duties), the Faculty 
Association, and the CAUT. When, after a very long time, and acting always through legal 
counsel on both sides, the agreement was completed, each side named a member of the panel 
and the Chief Justice of Canada named the chairman. There were lengthy hearings, conduct-
ed over a two-month period. The decision, when it finally came, was unanimous: even the 
complainant's nominee agreed that tenure should not be given. Since the case had given the 
University a great deal of bad publicity and cost it an enormous amount of money, time, 
and turmoil (along with even more serious consequences), I sent the report to the man who 
had been the Universities Minister at the time (he had since been moved to another portfolio). 
He wrote back a three-liner congratulating the University: "justice had both been done and 
been seen to be done ! " He did not offer to compensate the University for the costs of this 
visibility. 
It is important to recognize that what is involved is a change in atti tude, not just a dis-
position to intervene (although that may also have been present). There are many evidences 
that there was such a change; I choose one because of its illuminating chronology. In 1970 
a joint Board/Senate Committee recommended an increase in tuition fees. There was not at 
the time much financial pressure on the University, but some members of the Board, anti-
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cipating that there would be, thought the recommendation should be implemented. Others 
were unconvinced, and some thought it would be contrary to government wishes and there-
fore counter-productive. At a meeting with the Universities Grants Commission we asked 
whether the Commission or the government had a position on the matter. The UGC's answer 
was that fees were in the jurisdiction of the University. At the time I thought a fee increase 
unwise, and the Board accepted this view. By 1972 the financial situation had changed 
enough for the question to be raised again with the UGC, since despite the earlier response 
it would be imprudent to increase fees contrary to government wishes. The answer was 
superficially the same: it was up to the University. There were, however, some indirect in-
dications that a fee increase would not be welcome to the government, and the University 
took no action. In the following year, when the University was experiencing considerable 
financial pressure, there was renewed discussion of a possible increase, Manitoba's fees being 
by that time considerably lower than most. In a newspaper interview the Minister (the same 
man who had a few years earlier been so scrupulous about the University's autonomy) stated 
that "unequivocally there will not be any tuition fee increases"! The University learned 
about this from the newspaper story, and the university community, together with the public, 
drew appropriate inferences about the government's changed atti tude, not only toward the 
University's autonomy but toward the University itself, to which it could find no less damag-
ing a way to reveal its will than through the press. 
My most educational encounter with politicians was very complex and protracted, and 
fully reflected the changing government atti tude. During 1973 inflation was heating up, the 
unionization of the support staff was in effect completed, and that of the faculty was slowly 
moving forward. In October there was a 23-day strike of the second-largest union, and the 
settlement affected all staff costs. The University made appropriate representations to the 
UGC concerning increased operating costs for the coming year, explaining that the alternative, 
a reduction in staff, would not only mean a decline in quality but would be regarded as 
intimidation by the new and nascent unions, and arguing that by comparison with other 
major universities the University of Manitoba was underfunded and its salary structure too 
low. When the grant for 1974-75 was announced the Board of Governors, the majority of 
whom were government appointees, took the position that it was inadequate, and that to 
remain within it would mean a serious decline in the quality of the University, which the 
government had not indicated that it intended. The Board therefore adopted a "Phase One 
budget" which implied a large deficit for the coming year if salary settlements approximated 
current levels, and sent the Chairman and me to brief the Chairman of the UGC and then 
see the Minister (no longer the man involved in the incidents reported earlier), explain the 
situation to him, and report his reaction to the Board. 
After we had briefed the Chairman and Vice-chairman of the UGC, we met with the 
Minister. When we had put the full situation before him, emphasizing the deficit implications 
of the Board's action and the alternatives, and explaining that we were to report his response 
to the Board, he said that the government did not desire a reduction in the quality of the 
University and that he was not disturbed by our budget plan. He told us of parallel situations 
(some of which had in fact influenced the Board's discussion); for example, he pointed out 
that the province's major hospital had been left in a potential deficit position until its nego-
tiations with its unions were finished, and then been given a supplementary grant to enable 
it to meet the new levels; and he mentioned other analogous situations. So far as the Uni-
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versity was concerned, he said, "if we have to go into deficit financing, we'll go into deficit 
financing." 
We reported the Minister's response to the Board and the implementation of the budget 
began. The Chairman of the UGC started at once to work with our financial officers analyz-
ing the most recent years f rom budget to expenditure, and told me just before his retirement 
at the end of June that he was getting the information he needed. However, we heard nothing 
through the summer, so in September a delegation of the Board met with the Minister and 
the Acting-Chairman of the UGC (the former Vice-Chairman), and formally requested that 
the Minister underwrite the deficit he had encouraged and bring the level of University fund-
ing to that of the expenditure we had previously shown him. Ten days later we got his reply: 
if we had a financial problem we should approach the UGC! 
When we asked the UGC for a meeting they said that first they required new financial 
analyses for recent years, this time budget-to-budget. These took us two months working 
flat out to supply. Finally, late in December (three-quarters through the fiscal year), they 
saw us. They asked why, knowing that we were developing a deficit, we had not reduced 
our level of expenditure. When we replied by reporting the position taken in April by the 
Minister, the UGC said it had not been advised to that effect by the Minister. 
At the end of February, after consultation with government, the UGC (whose new Chair-
man had until two months earlier been the University's senior financial officer) announced 
its decision: it would assume half the deficit and give us five years to liquidate the other 
half, provided, among other conditions, we balanced the budget in fiscal 1975-76 (a month 
away). Taking into account the impact of the grant for 1975-76, announced at the same 
meeting, and comparing it with the level of current expenditures, we concluded that we 
would have to get almost $4 million out of the base for the immediately upcoming budget 
before allowing for salary and other essential increases. Because we had no option, we tried 
to do it, and one of the results was that we were unable to prevent a strike of our largest 
support staff union, due in part to a feeling of insecurity which affected everyone. There 
were other results, but I need not go into them here. 
After some weeks the strike became a serious worry to government, for it loomed very 
large in the Manitoba context: in its 45 days it amounted to about one-seventh of all man-
days lost in the province through strike or lockout action during the whole of 1975. Besides, 
although the essential work of the University continued, there was considerable turmoil on 
the campus, including some fairly spectacular incidents. There had therefore been growing 
demands that the Premier either settle the strike or make it possible for the University to do 
so. Finally, on April 25, the strikers marched on the Legislature demanding to see him; but 
at that moment he was, together with the Minister and the Chairman of the UGC, meeting 
with the Vice-Chairman of the Board and me, and an accommodation was worked out, sub-
ject however to being recommended by the UGC. It involved reducing the budget base (and 
with it of course the quality of the University) but spreading the required reduction about 
equally over two budgets instead of insisting on the ruinous instantaneity of the February 
dictum; and there would be a supplementary grant to meet the resultant deficit in the up-
coming year. On the strength of this understanding we were able to come to terms with the 
striking union. The understanding seemed imperilled several times during the following 
weeks (when the strike was settled the government's concern seemed to diminish), but in 
the end it held, and on June 20 the University was officially told that it could proceed with 
11 University Presidents and the Politicians 
its budget for the fiscal year then already a quarter finished, and that the further substantial 
deficit it showed would be met by a supplementary grant. 
For me this denouement of a turbulent and damaging, but highly instructive, action came 
just in time. I believe that when a university president voluntarily retires f rom office he 
should give a full year's notice to enable the university to find and install a successor without 
an interregnum; and my appointment period ran from July 1. With the strike settled (and 
on reasonable terms), the deficit budget and supplementary grant approved, the term for 
the liquidation of the remainder of the carryover deficit extended to ten years, and the inter-
nal situation much calmed, I felt that I had recovered a personal freedom of choice which I 
could not have exercised during a crisis; and the crucial letter confirming the government's 
decision was in hand with ten days to spare before the talismanic twelve-month period would 
begin. I promptly gave my year's notice. I felt that I had completed my general education in 
university-government relations. During the following year I did have something of a post-
graduate course, but I will not try to include anything from it here. 
The most significant and ominous thing about the events I've narrated is that they brought 
no great outcry, either f rom the general public or even (except concerning the tightness of 
funds) f rom the campus itself. This quiescence has a number of causes. In the case of the 
general public there is the reaction beginning in the late 1960's to which I've already referred, 
with its multiple sources. As this reaction gained momentum it revealed, and strengthened, 
an always powerful current of anti-intellectualism in the society, characteristically hostile to 
what it sees as unfounded pretensions on the part of the university (such as autonomy, aca-
demic freedom, and certain employment practices), and quick to believe that anyway the 
university is too expensive. For this sector of the public the spectacle of the "over-privileged" 
university getting its come-uppance was not unattractive. Certain elements in the media shared 
this position and catered to it, not always with much regard to accuracy or proportion, and, 
as is often the way with the media, devising villains and heroes. Many less hostile members of 
the public were kept neutral by the bad publicity, especially concerning the purported tax 
burden. There were some friends of the University willing to take a more supportive view, 
and a very few spoke out , but most were puzzled and deterred by the cross-currents in the 
university community itself, emphasized and exaggerated as they were by the media. 
These internal differences were related to differences of interest. For example, although 
a resolution was adopted in Senate condemning the Minister's imposition of arbitration in 
the tenure case, it was naturally opposed by the Faculty Association, which had sought the 
action, and therefore was seen from outside (and especially by government) less as a protest 
against the invasion of university autonomy than as part of the struggle over faculty unioni-
zation. Again, there were denunciations of the Minister's dictum on tuition fees, but many 
student representatives were pleased by it and said so, and certain other groups, which want-
ed the Student Union's or the Minister's support for their own ends, also defended it. As 
for the long-drawn-out budget issue, the clash and swirl of interest and faction were almost 
infinitely varied, encompassing the hostilities engendered by two major strikes, the polariza-
tion accompanying the partial unionization of the faculty, and panic fears and struggles 
which broke out when the paper deficit suddenly turned into a real financial crisis. In short, 
at a time of great change in the University, many divergent interests were struggling for pre-
ponderance and advantage, some of them using tactics which were effective for their imme-
diate purpose but seriously weakened the university's influence with both public and govern-
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ment, and therefore left it more exposed to pressure and reduced the support it could expect. 
For if I have a general conclusion to draw from my experiences with politicians it is that 
(with allowance made for exceptional individuals) a university's relations with government 
(or a university president's with the "politicians") reflect primarily the realities of power 
and influence of the moment. A corollary of this is that if politicians or governments do not 
wish to be bound by earlier commitments their promises are unenforceable by universities 
at a time of low influence. 
